In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable structures, which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition structures. As an allocation rule on complete coalition structures, this paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value for complete coalition structures and provides an axiomatization. JEL classification: C71.
Introduction
One way to describe the structure of partial cooperation in the context of cooperative games is to specify sets of feasible coalitions with some appropriate properties. Algaba et al. (2000) considered union stable structures as such sets. A union stable structure has the property that the union of two intersecting feasible coalitions is also feasible, which can be interpreted as follows: players who are common members of two feasible coalitions are able to act as intermediaries to elicit cooperation among all the players in either of these coalitions, and so their union should be a feasible unit of cooperation as well. As shown by Algaba et al. (2000) , for a given set of feasible coalitions, there exists a minimal union stable structure including the set. It consists of feasible coalitions evoked by intermediaries as well as the original ones. Furthermore, such a minimal union stable structure is unique. This implies that sets of feasible coalitions with the same minimal union stable structure containing them form an equivalence class.
The union stable structures are essentially the domain of the Myerson value, as shown by Algaba et al. (2001) . The Myerson value introduced by Myerson (1977) is a solution for cooperative games under the partial cooperation structures described by networks, i.e., sets of two-player coalitions. Myerson (1980) and van den Nouweland et al. (1992) considered the partial cooperation structures described by sets of coalitions (not necessarily two-player coalitions), and studied the Myerson value for them. The Myerson value in the sense of Myerson (1980) and van den Nouweland et al. (1992) assigns the same payoff vectors to all sets of coalitions belonging to the same equivalence class represented by a minimal union stable structure, which implies that the union stable structures are essentially the domain of the Myerson value. On the basis of this observation, Algaba et al. (2001) introduced the Myerson value for union stable structures and provided an axiomatization for it.
In this paper, we introduce complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property with the following interpretation: given a set of feasible coalitions, if each pair of players in a group of players can work together in some feasible coalition contained in the group, then the group itself becomes a feasible unit of cooperation. It can be shown that any union stable structure is a complete coalition structure, but not every complete coalition structure is a union stable structure. Thus, the complete coalition structures are a strictly larger class than the union stable structures.
The study of complete coalition structures is motivated by our observation that the requirement of union stable structures is too strong in some cases. Coming back to the above interpretation of union stable structures, one may wish to describe a situation where the cost for the intermediaries is too high to elicit cooperation because the two feasible coalitions contain a great number of players with only a few common players. Also, it is interesting to consider a situation where only limited communication channels are available because the distance or direction of communication is restricted. For example, if players are located along a very long line and only adjacent players can communicate, or if players are partially ordered (as in a hierarchical organization) and only comparable players can communicate, then all the players may not be able to share the information necessary for cooperation. Complete coalition structures can differentiate these situations, while union stable structures cannot.
This paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value for complete coalition structures and provides an axiomatization for it. The Myerson value for complete coalition structures coincides with the Myerson value over the union stable structures, but it also assigns payoff vectors to those complete coalition structures that are not union stable structures. Thus, it provides a method of more refined assignments of payoff vectors than the Myerson value for union stable structures.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Preliminary definitions and results are summarized in Section 2. Complete coalition structures are introduced in Section 3. The main result is stated in Section 4 and is proved in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players. A game v is a function from 2 N to R with v(∅) = 0.
A nonempty subset S ∈ 2 N is a coalition, and by convention, 2 N is interpreted as the set of all coalitions. The unanimity game on a coalition T is denoted by u T and defined as
Each game v is uniquely represented as a linear combination of unanimity games (Shapley, 1953) :
The coefficient β T in (1) 
T is determined recursively by the following rule:
Note that the above rule is rewritten as v H (S) = v(S) for each S ∈ H and β H T = 0 for each T ̸ ∈ H. This implies the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The
This lemma states that the H-projected game of v is in fact a projection in the following sense. Let the space of all games be parametrized in such a way that the set of parameters of
The game v H is the orthogonal projection of v to the subspace of games with β T = 0 for each T ̸ ∈ H. The Shapley value of a game v is the payoff vector ϕ(v) ∈ R N given by the following formula (Shapley, 1953) :
In particular, the Shapley value of u T is given by
Since the Shapley value is linear in games, we have an alternative formula for the Shapley value of v = ∑ T ∈2 N β T u T which is as follows:
for each S ∈ 2 N . Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) showed that p exists uniquely and called it the potential for v.
there exists a unique game p satisfying (3), which is given by
p = ∑ T ∈2 N β T |T | u T .
Furthermore, the vector of the marginal contributions (p(N ) − p(N \{i})) i∈N coincides with the Shapley value of v; that is,
ϕ i (v) = p(N ) − p(N \{i}) for each i ∈ N .
Complete coalition structures
We regard H ⊆ 2 N as a set of feasible coalitions that describes a partial cooperation structure. For example, consider {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}}, where each pair of players in {1, 2, 3} can work together in terms of some feasible coalition contained in {1, 2, 3}. In our concept of feasible coalitions defined below, the coalition {1, 2, 3} is deemed to be also feasible, and {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}, {1, 2, 3}} is the set of all feasible coalitions. We call such a set a complete coalition structure.
To provide a formal definition of a complete coalition structure, we introduce a concept of "Hassociated" relation in a coalition. Given a set of feasible coalitions H, we say that a pair of players in a coalition S are H-associated in S if there exists a feasible coalition in H S containing the pair, in terms of which they can communicate and cooperate with each other and work together.
We say that a coalition S is H-complete if any pair of players in S are H-associated in S; that is, the "H-associated" relation in S is complete.
Given a set of feasible coalitions H, a H-complete coalition is deemed to be also feasible. We define a complete coalition structure as a set of all feasible coalitions in this sense.
1 Originally, Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) defined a potential as a real-valued function on the space of games. The value assigned by the potential to the restriction of a game v to a coalition S corresponds to p(S) in this paper.
2 In the literature, i, j ∈ S are said to be
Definition 4 A set of coalitions H ⊆ 2 N is a complete coalition structure provided it is the set of all H-complete coalitions.
It is straightforward to see that {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}, {1, 2, 3}} is a complete coalition structure, whereas {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}} is not.
The set of all H-complete coalitions contains H because each S ∈ H is a H-complete coalition. As the next lemma shows, the set of all H-complete coalitions is the minimal complete coalition structure containing H. For a proof, see Kajii et al. (2007) Let CCS denote the set of all complete coalition structures. The following property of CCS is important in this paper.
Proof. It is enough to show that H ∈ H S if and only if
There are some other feasible coalition structures which are complete coalition structures, including union stable structures introduced by Algaba et al. (2000) .
Definition 5 A set of coalitions H ⊆ 2
N is a union stable structure provided S, T ∈ H with
Let USS denote the set of all union stable structures. It is straightforward to check that if H ∈ USS, then H S ∈ USS for each S ∈ 2 N . The next lemma shows that every union stable structure is a complete coalition structure.
Lemma 4 The set of all union stable structures USS is contained in CCS.
Proof. Let H ∈ USS. We show that H ∈ CCS. Since each S ∈ H is H-complete by definition, it is enough to show that if S ∈ 2 N is H-complete then S ∈ H. Without loss of generality, let S = {1, . . . , k}. If k = 1 and any i, j ∈ S are H-associated in S, then there exists H ∈ H S with 1 ∈ H, which implies that
To illustrate the difference between complete coalition structures and union stable structures, for player n to act as an intermediary is very high. Note that if H is closed in a union operation (i.e. S ∪T ∈ H for any S, T ∈ H) then H is a union stable structure and thus it is a complete coalition structure. For example, antimatroids (Algaba et al., 2004) and the feasible coalition structures derived from permission structures (Gilles and Owen, 1999; Gilles et al., 1992) or precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern, 1992) are closed in a union operation. Therefore, these are all complete coalition structures.
4
Other examples of complete coalition structures can be derived from a preorder ≼ on N, 5 which are different from the feasible coalition structures derived from permission structures or precedence constraints.
6 The next two general lemmas show that a set of intervals is a complete coalition structure even if it is not closed in a union operation.
Proof. We write i ∼ j if i ≼ j and j ≼ i, and i ≺ j if i ≼ j but not j ≼ i. The binary relation ≺ is irreflexive by construction, and transitive since ≼ is transitive. Note that any S ∈ 2 N has i ∈ S such that there is no j ∈ S withī ≺ j since S is a finite set. We call such i a maximal element of S following the corresponding concept on a partially ordered set. Let S be a H-complete coalition with a maximal element i. By H-completeness, for any j ∈ S, there exists m ∈ S such that i, j ∈ {k : k ≼ m} ∈ H S . By the property of i, m ∼ i must follow.
For example, let ≼ be such that 1 ≼ 2, 2 ≼ 4, 1 ≼ 3, and 3 ≼ 4. By the above lemma, H 1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} is a complete coalition structure, which is not a union stable structure. The minimal union stable structure containing H 1 is H 2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
The difference is that {1, 2, 3} is feasible in H 2 , but not in H 1 . To interpret this, imagine that ≼ describes the possible direction of information flow between players: players i and j can share the same information if i ≼ j. Assume that a coalition is feasible if every player in the coalition can share the same information; that is, it is of the form {k : k ≼ i}. Then, {1, 2, 3} is not of this form and thus is not feasible.
Lemma 6 Let ≼ be a preorder on N . If H ⊆ {{k
Proof. Let ∼ and ≺ be the binary relations as in the proof of Lemma 5. Let S be a H-complete coalition with a maximal element i and a minimal element i. By H-completeness, for any j ∈ S, there exist m, m ∈ S such that i, j ∈ {k : m ≼ k ≼ m} ∈ H S , and there exist m, m ∈ S such that i, j ∈ {k : m ≼ k ≼ m} ∈ H S . By the property of i and i, m ∼ i and m ∼ i must follow. This implies that i ≼ j ≼ i for all j ∈ S. On the other hand, there exist m 
The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
Given a game v, we consider allocation rules on complete coalition structures. An allocation rule on complete coalition structures is a mapping f : CCS → R N such that if i ̸ ∈ S for each S ∈ H then f i (H) = 0. We propose the following allocation rule.
Definition 6 The Myerson value for complete coalition structures is a mapping
This is an allocation rule on complete coalition structures because if i ̸ ∈ S for each S ∈ H then i is a null player in v H and thus f i (H) = ϕ i (v H ) = 0. This allocation rule restricted to union stable structures coincides with the Myerson value for union stable structures studied by Algaba et al. (2001) . To see this, for H ∈ USS, define
C(H) ≡ {T ∈ H | T is maximal in H},
which is a partition of ∪ T ∈H T . For a game v and a union stable structure H, a game r H is the
Note that H S is also a union stable structure. 
Lemma 7 For a game v and a union stable structure H, the H-restricted game of v is the H-
We characterize the Myerson value for complete coalition structures in terms of the following axioms for allocation rules on complete coalition structures. (Myerson, 1977) , which consists of fairness and component efficiency. Thus, the set of axioms of Algaba et al. (2001) is different from ours.
Feasible coalition efficiency (FE) For each H ∈ CCS, if S ∈ H and H
Balanced contribution (BC) For each H ∈ CCS and i, j ∈ N ,
No contribution by unassociated players (NC)
For each H ∈ CCS, if i, j ∈ N are not H-associated in N , then f i (H) − f i (H −j ) = 0.
Fairness (FA) For each H ∈ CCS, if i, j ∈ H ∈ H and H\{H} ∈ CCS, then
FE states that if S is feasible and all players outside S stand alone, then the members of S allocate to themselves the total wealth v(S) available to them.
8 BC states that player j's contribution to i equals i's contribution to j. NC states that player j's contribution to i equals zero if i and j are not H-associated in N . FA states that if a feasible coalition is removed and the resulting set remains to be a complete coalition structure, then the changes of payoffs are the same for all players in the feasible coalition. Myerson (1977 Myerson ( , 1980 introduces FA and BC and shows that BC implies FA in his formulation. The reader may wonder if the presumption in FA in our formulation may be vacuous in some cases, but the next lemma shows that it is not the case. 
Lemma 8 For
• If S ̸ ∈ H and i, j ∈ S are not H-associated in S, then
Notice the resemblance between p H in (iv) and the potential for v. The latter satisfies (3) for each S ∈ 2 N , whereas the former satisfies (3) for each S ∈ H, which is condition (5). Condition (6) 
When more coalitions to which player 1 does not belong are feasible, player 1 has smaller bargaining power, which results in a smaller payoff to player 1.
When we apply the Myerson value for complete coalition structures for a given partial cooperation structure, it is important to carefully identify a set of feasible coalitions H describing the partial cooperation structure. To address this issue, let H denote the minimal union stable structure containing H ∈ CCS, 9 and assume that we require ∑ i∈S f i (H) = v(S) for each S ∈ C(H),
10
which is not always true in the Myerson value for complete coalition structures. This requirement implies that, for each S ∈ C(H), the total wealth v(S) is available to the members of S; that is, each S ∈ C(H) is feasible. Thus, when we require ∑ i∈S f i (H) = v(S) for each S ∈ C(H), we must choose H satisfying C(H) ⊆ H to be logically consistent in the analysis. If this is the case, we indeed have ∑ i∈S f i (H) = v(S) for each S ∈ C(H) as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 9 Let f : CCS → R N be the Myerson value for complete coalition structures. If H ∈

CCS and C(H) ⊆ H, then ∑ i∈S f i (H) = v(S) for each S ∈ C(H).
Proof. Suppose that C(H) ⊆ H. Then, for each S ∈ C(H), it holds that S ∈ H S = (H S ) S . Thus, ∑ i∈S f i (H S ) = v(S) by FE. Since i ∈ S and j ̸ ∈ S are not associated in N , f i (H S ) = f i (H) by NC, and thus ∑ i∈S f i (H) = v(S) for each S ∈ C(H).
The proof
This section provides the proof of Proposition 2. It proceeds in the following order: (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (iv) ⇔ (i).
(ii) ⇒ (iii)
p
